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 Next term, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, the Supreme Court will consider whether a 
baker’s religious objection to same-sex marriage justifies his 
violation of Colorado’s public accommodation law in refusing to 
bake a cake for a same-sex wedding. At the centerpiece of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a clash between the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause or, more precisely, the principles of equality in 
commercial life as grounded in Colorado’s public accommodation 
law. In exploring the purpose inherent in regulating private 
conduct through public accommodation laws, this Essay suggests 
that the reconciliation of these seemingly irreconcilable interests is 
rooted in their common intrinsic value: maintaining the social 
order. Ultimately, Masterpiece Cakeshop provides an opportunity 
for the Court to reclaim the grounding principles inherent in public 
accommodation laws that recognize the civic duty in “serving the 
public” and hold that free exercise must bow to equal protection 
when necessary to maintain the social order. 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ...................................................................... 87 
                                                                                                     
*  Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; 
LL.M., Yale University (1995); J.D., University of Florida (1991); M.S.S.A., Case 
Western Reserve University (1976); B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison 
(1974). 
**  Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; J.D., 
University of Florida Levin College of Law (2005); B.A., Franklin and Marshall 
College (2002). Our deepest appreciation goes out to Jen Hosp who worked 
tirelessly to put the finishing touches on this Essay. 
CONTEMPLATING MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 87 
II. The Law of Public Accommodation and the Wedding Cake 
Conundrum ................................................................................... 90 
III. Free Exercise of Religion and the Social Order ............... 96 
IV. Conclusion ....................................................................... 101 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 On the two-year anniversary of its historic same-sex 
marriage decision, which extended the fundamental right to marry 
to same-sex couples,1 the Supreme Court announced it would hear 
a case that takes center stage in an ongoing battle between 
religious liberty and LGBT rights.2 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,3 Jack Phillips, a self-
described “cake artist,” appeals a Colorado decision4 finding him 
liable for sexual orientation discrimination under the Colorado 
Anti-Discrimination Act5 (“CADA”) for refusing to bake a wedding 
cake for a same-sex couple.6 Phillips invoked the First Amendment 
in arguing that the State’s application of CADA to his case, 
essentially compelling him to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex 
wedding in contradiction of his deeply-held religious beliefs, 
violated his free speech and free exercise rights.7 The Colorado 
                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; LL.M., 
Yale University (1995); J.D., University of Florida (1991); M.S.S.A., Case Western 
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** Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; J.D., 
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College (2002). Our deepest appreciation goes out to Jen Hosp who worked 
tirelessly to put the finishing touches on this Essay. 
1.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111, 2017 
WL 2722428 (June 26, 2017) (granting certiorari). 
3.  Id. 
4.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015). 
5.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2012). 
6.  See Craig, 370 P.3d at 279 (“We conclude that the act of same-sex marriage 
is closely correlated to [plaintiffs’] sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did 
not err when he found Masterpiece’s refusal to create a wedding cake for 
[plaintiffs] was ‘because of’ their sexual orientation, in violation of the CADA.”). 
7.  Id. at 284–288. 
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Court of Appeals rejected his claim, holding that his compliance 
with CADA “merely require[d] that [he] not discriminate against 
potential customers . . . and that such conduct, even if compelled 
by the government, is not sufficiently expressive to warrant First 
Amendment protections.”8   
  At the heart of Masterpiece Cakeshop is a question 
implicating the collision of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
or, more precisely, the principles of equality in commercial life as 
grounded in Colorado’s public accommodation law. As such, the 
Court will be forced to reconcile the competing values and legal 
tests embedded in these constitutional rights. The question the 
Court will consider next term juxtaposes the individual rights of 
the claimants with the individual rights of the shop owner:  
Whether applying Colorado’s public 
accommodations law to compel the petitioner to 
create expression that violates his sincerely held 
religious beliefs about marriage violates the free 
speech or free exercise clauses of the First 
Amendment.9  
  While this case requires the Court to resolve more precise 
First Amendment questions concerning compelled speech and 
artistic expression, this essay attempts to disentangle the broader 
legal issues at the centerpiece of cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop 
that pit religious exercise against LGBT rights. In doing so, one 
thing is clear: the Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop will 
provide important insight into its predisposition toward future free 
exercise cases that pose an even closer question because they are 
strengthened by the presence of robust religious freedom laws.  
  Indeed, Masterpiece Cakeshop provides an easier case for 
LGBT rights to triumph over the free exercise rights of business 
owners than other cases percolating their way up through the 
                                                                                                     
8.  Id. at 286.  
9.  Petition for Writ of Certiori, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, No. 16-111 2017 WL 2722428 (July 22, 2016), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/16-111-cert-petition.pdf. 
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federal courts. While CADA strengthens the same-sex couple’s 
claim by expressly prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, many state and local public accommodation laws do 
not include sexual orientation under their protective umbrella, and 
the Equal Protection Clause does not afford heightened protection 
to individuals claiming sexual orientation discrimination.10 
Conversely, since Colorado lacks a state Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), Phillips could not invoke Hobby Lobby11 
to support his argument that strict scrutiny judicial review is the 
appropriate standard to apply to his free exercise claim, even if, 
contrary to his position, CADA is a neutral law of general 
applicability. 
  Hypothetically, had Colorado lacked CADA’s express 
protection for sexual orientation and also had a state RFRA 
mandating strict judicial scrutiny of free exercise challenges, 
Phillips’ claim would be much stronger. The confluence of the 
presence of these realities in other cases seems to forecast a legal 
landscape that secures religious liberties at the sacrifice of civil 
rights. 
This essay proceeds in two parts. First, it recognizes the 
values inherent in regulating private conduct through public 
accommodation laws. It argues that since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was never intended to prohibit private 
discrimination,12 it should not now be used to permit it. Second, it 
examines the important justification for governmental restriction 
of free exercise: when such restriction is in the interest of the social 
                                                                                                     
10.  See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality: 
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1047 (2016) (explaining how LGBT-protective 
non-discrimination laws are diminishing due to the proliferation of state 
preemption laws that prohibit municipalities from passing non-discrimination 
ordinances that exceed the state’s existing coverage).  
11.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 22 (2014). Although Hobby 
Lobby involved the federal RFRA, it sets the precedent for businesses, invoking 
state RFRA laws, to refuse services to LGBT patrons based on religious beliefs. 
12.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883) (holding that Congress had 
no “direct and primary” authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to enact legislation regulating private race discrimination). 
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order.13 Ultimately, the essay suggests that the reconciliation of 
the seemingly irreconcilable clash between the guarantees of free 
exercise and equal protection is rooted in their common intrinsic 
value: maintaining the social order. Masterpiece Cakeshop 
provides an opportunity for the Court to reclaim the grounding 
principles inherent in public accommodation laws that recognize 
the civic duty in “serving the public” and hold that free exercise 
must bow to equal protection when necessary to maintain the 
social order. 
 
II. The Law of Public Accommodation and the Wedding Cake 
Conundrum 
  The law of public accommodation finds its roots in early 
English common law. Joseph Singer’s No Right to Exclude: Public 
Accommodations and Private Property outlines the evolution of the 
theory of public accommodation law.14 Dating back to sixteenth 
century England, where early case law required innkeepers to 
admit guests if the inn was not already full, the concept of what we 
now understand as public accommodation law was based on the 
premise that “one that has made [a] profession of a public 
employment is bound to the utmost extent of that employment to 
serve the public.”15 Famous English Judge Lord Holt described the 
common-law duty to serve the public without discrimination as an 
absolute responsibility bound inextricably in the “profession of a 
trade which is for the public good.”16  
  Without using the term “public accommodation,” Lord Holt 
seemed to imply that individuals serving in “public employment” 
had a duty to serve the public without discrimination.17 A 
subsequent English case defined “public employment” as one “in 
which the owner has held himself out as ready to serve the public 
                                                                                                     
13.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that a criminal 
polygamy law comported with the First Amendment because it punished conduct, 
not beliefs). 
14.  Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and 
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1303–1411 (1996). 
15.  Id. at 1305 (citing White’s Case, 2 Dyer 343 (1586)). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
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by exercising his trade.”18 According to Singer, the principle that 
an innkeeper who “induce[s] people to think that he is a common 
innkeeper . . . is bound as such to receive those who offer 
themselves” emanates from the appearance of being open to the 
public.19 In essence, the businessman that held himself out to serve 
the public was thus obligated to serve the public.20 
  The contractual principles supporting the duty to serve the 
public indiscriminately made their way into American 
jurisprudence during the antebellum period.21 As Singer recalls, 
several prominent American legal scholars reiterated the “holding 
out theory,” requiring innkeepers and carriers of goods to serve the 
public if they held themselves out to serve the public.22 
  Today, places of public accommodation “are those 
intrinsically hybrid entities that are private as against the state 
yet simultaneously open to the public.”23 While it is now customary 
for Congress to prohibit private discrimination in places of public 
accommodation, such was not always the case. Well over a century 
ago, the Supreme Court struck down portions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 and held that Congress did not have the express power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit private 
discrimination.24 The Court limited the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to state action only and held that Congress had no 
“direct and primary” authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prohibit race discrimination by private actors.25  
  Seventy years later, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States,26 the Court held that Congress possessed ample power 
                                                                                                     
18.  Id. (citing Gisbourn v. Hurst, 91 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1710)). 
19.  Id. at 1311 (citing FREDERICK CHARLES MONCREIFF, THE LIABILITY OF 
INNKEEPERS (1874)). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. (citing JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826); JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE 
CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW (1832); THEOPHILUS PARSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(1853); FRANCIS HILLARD, THE LAW OF TORTS (1859)). 
23.  Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market 
Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (2001). 
24.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883). 
25.  Id. at 20. 
26.  379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
prohibiting private discrimination in places of public 
accommodation.27 The Court recognized that innate in the 
Commerce Clause power is the power to regulate not just 
interstate but also intrastate commerce that has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce and defined public accommodations 
as establishments with “operations [that] affect commerce.”28 
Thus, private discrimination in public accommodations could be 
prohibited under Congress’s broad Commerce Clause powers.29 
Since Heart of Atlanta, Congress has invoked its Commerce Clause 
powers in enacting laws that regulate private conduct in places of 
public accommodation.30  
  Admittedly, Masterpiece Cakeshop involves state law, and 
the power of states to regulate their citizens’ private conduct is 
much broader than the scope of congressional authority limited by 
the enumerated powers doctrine.31 States enjoy general police 
powers, which the federal government does not.32 Nevertheless, 
Heart of Atlanta firmly established that private discrimination is 
not outside the reach of even Congress’s limited and expressly 
defined power to regulate.33 
                                                                                                     
27.  Id. at 245–46. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. at 276–77. 
30.  See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 
277–80 (1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977, which regulates private lands, as a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause powers); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155 (1971) (upholding the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act, which criminalizes private conduct, as a valid 
exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294, 299–301 (1964) (upholding Congress’ power to prohibit race 
discrimination in small, private restaurants as a valid exercise of its Commerce 
Clause powers).  
31.  See United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566, 603 (1995) (holding that the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional because it did not have 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce).  
32. See id. (discussing the constitutional limitations of the federal government’s 
legislative authority).  
33.  See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261–262 (upholding the relevant 
provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because they are limited to 
“enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of 
goods and people”). 
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  The link between discrimination in public accommodations 
and commerce is well-documented. Indeed, studies document the 
negative economic effects of LGBT discrimination in places of 
public accommodation,34 and the daily headlines report anecdotal 
evidence of consumer boycotts and canceled concerts or sporting 
events in protest of states’ anti-LBGT policies.35  
  Considering the early roots of public accommodation laws 
and the well-recognized link between discrimination against 
patrons and negative economic effects, the Commerce Clause and 
state police powers are the appropriate sources of governmental 
authority to regulate private discrimination in public 
accommodations.  
  In addition to its limited scope to regulate private conduct, 
the Fourteenth Amendment has provided little protection to LGBT 
persons from official government discrimination.36 Although the 
LBGT community rejoiced after Obergefell, that case and previous 
ones striking laws targeting the LGBT community have not 
provided heightened protection for LGBT members as a class 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, Obergefell secured the 
liberty interests inherent in the right to marry as protected by 
substantive due process.37 The unfortunate reality of the Court’s 
measured decision is that same-sex couples can get married in the 
morning, lose their jobs in the afternoon, and be evicted from their 
apartments all on the same day. Because the Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause provides scant anti-discrimination protection for 
LGBT persons, state and local anti-discrimination laws are critical 
for protecting LGBT civil rights—by prohibiting both public and 
                                                                                                     
34.  See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 2105) 
(citing MICH. DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION UNDER 
MICHIGAN LAW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74–90 (2013), 
http://perma.cc/Q6UL-L3JR) (discussing the negative economic effects of anti-
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender discrimination in places of public 
accommodation). 
35.  See Day, supra note 10, at 1063 (discussing the trend of LGBT-inclusive 
businesses boycotting states with overly-expansive religious freedom laws).  
36.  See id. at 1029–1031 (examining the evolution of legal protections for the 
LGBT community). 
37.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (holding that the 
fundamental right to marry includes the right to same-sex marriage). 
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private discrimination. 
  The Supreme Court has not wavered from its early 
interpretation that enforcement of rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires state action. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Phillips relies on the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, as 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
escape the anti-discrimination dictates of CADA.38 In essence, 
Phillips argues that Colorado’s application of CADA to him is the 
“state action” required for invocation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As such, judicial enforcement of CADA violates his 
free exercise rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and Colorado or the court should excuse compliance 
and legitimize his private discrimination of patrons based on 
sexual orientation. This argument fails for two reasons. 
  First, CADA does not target, implicate, or encroach on 
religious exercise. Only laws that “target the religious for ‘special 
disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status’” implicate the Free 
Exercise Clause.39  This is not a case that “imposes a penalty on 
the free exercise of religion” by “denying a generally available 
benefit solely on account of religious identity.”40 In its most recent 
Free Exercise case, the Supreme Court said that a religious school 
could not be prevented from “compet[ing] with secular 
organizations for a grant” solely because it was church affiliated.41 
If religious affiliation does not justify the exclusion from a secular 
benefit, it cannot also justify the exclusion from compliance with a 
secular obligation. This manipulation of the law, by which Phillips 
is attempting to avail himself, is the ultimate “having your cake 
                                                                                                     
38.  See Petition for Writ of Certiori, supra note 9 (arguing that the State of 
Colorado’s application of CADA to him, requiring him to bake a cake for a same-
sex couple, violates his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion 
without government intrusion). 
39.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2019 
(2017); see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (PAREN),overturned due to legislative action, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b) (1993) (holding that the State of Oregon could deny 
unemployment benefits to an individual terminated from employment for using 
peyote, even though such use was part of a religious ritual). 
40.  McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 628 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972)).  
41.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 137 S.Ct. at 2015. 
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and eating it too” contradiction.  
  Second, a court-sanctioned “pass” allowing Phillips to 
violate CADA by refusing to serve same-sex couples might open 
the floodgates, allowing all business owners to invoke religious 
freedom as a pretext to discriminate against LGBT patrons in 
public accommodations. The carving out of exceptions in LGBT-
protective public accommodation laws or the legitimization of such 
discrimination through application of robust state RFRA laws may 
constitute state action that violates the Federal Equal Protection 
Clause or a state equivalent. It is well-settled that states cannot 
discriminate against a class of individuals based on animus alone, 
even under a more liberal rational basis review.42 Government-
sanctioned conduct that makes an entire class “unequal to 
everyone else” is never a legitimate government purpose.43   
  The Colorado Court of Appeals correctly determined that 
CADA is a neutral law of general applicability subject to rational 
basis judicial review. In contrast, Phillips argues that the 
application of CADA is replete with individualized exceptions; 
therefore, rejection of his religious objection targets religion and 
requires application of strict scrutiny. Phillips erroneously equates 
his blanket refusal to bake all wedding cakes for same-sex couples 
based on their status with refusal to bake a specific cake for an 
individual because of its odious message. This argument conflates 
what he asserts here – the right to deny a service to an entire group 
of patrons based on their membership in a particular class, which 
violates CADA—with the right to refuse to bake a cake with a 
morally reprehensible message, which is permissible.44 Just weeks 
ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that there is no Free Exercise 
                                                                                                     
42.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a Colorado 
constitutional amendment prohibiting any government entity or court to extend 
anti-discrimination protections based on sexual orientation violated the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
43.  Id. 
44.  See, e.g., Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39 (1997) (holding that an 
attorney’s blanket refusal to represent a potential client because he was male 
violated Massachusetts public accommodation law, whereas attorneys may 
exercise discretion, consistent with ethical rules, in refusing to represent a 
potential client, as long as the decision is not predicated on a wholesale refusal to 
serve an entire class of individuals).  
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concern when “the laws in question have been neutral and 
generally applicable without regard to religion.”45 CADA does not 
single out Phillips or any business owner for disfavored treatment 
based on religion.  
  Since the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is that it was never intended to prohibit private 
discrimination, it should not now be used to permit it. Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court should reaffirm its longstanding precedent 
that the Fourteenth Amendment is neither a shield nor a sword 
when private conduct is at issue.  
III. Free Exercise of Religion and the Social Order 
 Jack Phillips’ assertion of religious freedom as a justification 
for refusing to bake a cake for same-sex partners Charlie Craig and 
David Mullins is a prime illustration of the palpable backlash felt 
across the nation to the Obergefell decision and other emerging legal 
protections for the LGBT community. Opponents of marriage 
equality are increasingly asserting their own religious beliefs to 
justify discrimination against LGBT members in public 
accommodations and other public arenas.46 The invocation of the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and both the federal RFRA 
and state mini-RFRAs pits free exercise against equal protection, 
creating a dynamic that could lead to government-sanctioned 
discrimination which, in the aggregate, could result in the 
systematic unequal treatment of LGBT individuals.47 
  In fact, three years ago, the Court denied certiorari in Elane 
Photography v. Willock,48 a case with a similar fact pattern to 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. When a New Mexico photography company 
refused to photograph a patron’s same-sex commitment ceremony 
in the name of religious freedom, the patron sued, claiming that 
Elane Photography violated the New Mexico Human Rights Law’s 
                                                                                                     
45.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 2015. 
46.  See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A 
Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DePaul L. Rev. 907, 919–923 (2016) (describing 
the efforts of conservative lawmakers to pit religion against LGBT rights, 
including the proliferation of robust religious freedom laws).  
47.  See id. at 926–927 (describing anecdotal evidence of businesses increasingly 
denying service to same-sex couples in the name of religious freedom). 
48.  309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1787 (2014). 
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prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination.49 
Ultimately, the patron’s civil liberties prevailed, trumping the 
business owners’ invocation of the First Amendment.50  
Elane Photography spelled the start of a new era—an era 
in which the LGBT community would find itself unfairly pitted 
against an increasingly-conservative religious community. The 
tension caused by such a division grew as a slew of similar cases 
arose and left many throughout the country in further dissension 
over the issue of LGBT civil rights vis-à-vis businesses’ religious 
beliefs and practices.51   
Although New Mexico did not have a state RFRA on the 
books at the time, the conflict in Elane Photography foreshadowed 
the potential real-life impact of an overly-protective state RFRA 
that compelled strict scrutiny judicial review over laws that 
purportedly violate an individual’s religious freedom. With all of 
the cards stacked in favor of religious freedom and no express anti-
discrimination protections for same-sex patrons, a court 
considering the same case under an overly-expansive mini-RFRA 
may very well have found in favor of Elane Photography.  
  But longstanding First Amendment principles open the 
door to governmental restriction of free exercise when a religious 
practice is against the social order. Indeed, as early as the late 
1800s, in its first Free Exercise case, the Supreme Court discussed 
the government’s interest in preserving the social order.52  In 
upholding an anti-polygamy statute that allegedly violated the 
Mormon duty to practice polygamy, the Court distinguished 
between religious belief and religious practices and opined that 
government could restrict “actions which were in violation of social 
                                                                                                     
49.  Id. at 59. 
50.  Id. at 77 (holding that New Mexico’s enforcement of its human rights law, 
which compelled a photographer to photograph a same-sex wedding, did not 
violate the First Amendment). 
51.  See, e.g., State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5 2015 
WL 720213, at *3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (holding that a flower shop 
owner discriminated against patrons on the basis of sexual orientation in 
violation of State law when she refused to provide flowers for their same-sex 
wedding). 
52.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a criminal 
polygamy law that punished conduct, rather than belief, that was “in violation of 
social duties or subversive of good order”). 
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duties or subversive [of] good order.”53 This principle was 
reaffirmed over a century later when the Court dismissed a free 
exercise challenge to the state’s denial of unemployment 
compensation benefits to persons who ingested peyote in violation 
of the state’s criminal laws.54 Although peyote use was part of the 
Native American Church’s religious ceremonies, the Court rejected 
the argument that a religious motivation could excuse conduct 
proscribed by a valid criminal law which did not specifically target 
the religious practice.55 
  Like the Reynolds Court a century before, the Smith Court 
recognized that the exercise of religion involves not only belief and 
profession but “the performance of (or abstention from) physical 
acts.”56 While religious beliefs are beyond the reach of government 
regulation, actions are not. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, where 
Phillips claims a religious motivation excuses his compliance with 
the anti-discrimination mandates of CADA, the values inherent in 
enforcing public accommodation laws and restricting religiously-
motivated discrimination go hand in hand. A governmental 
sanction of private discrimination is against the social order.  
 Finally, most scholars and jurists attempting to reconcile this 
clash between religious exercise and equal protection have focused 
their analysis on the strength of the Fourteenth Amendment, levels 
of judicial scrutiny, and the fundamental rights inherent in the First 
Amendment.57 While Phillips’ First Amendment claims in 
                                                                                                     
53.  Id. at 164.  
54.  See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (reaffirming 
Congress’ power to regulate criminal conduct that affects interstate commerce 
and is “subversive of good order”). 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at 872. 
57.  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the 
Future of LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (2015) (examining the 
competing interests inherent in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Kyle C. Velte, All 
Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the Religious Right’s 
Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing 
that state anti-discrimination laws should trump state RFRAs and opining that 
anti-discrimination laws do not compel speech in violation of the First 
Amendment); M. Katherine Baird Darmer, “Immutability” and Stigma: Towards a 
More Progressive Equal Protection Rights Discourse, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 439 (2010) (examining the immutability component of the suspect class 
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Masterpiece Cakeshop do not receive heightened scrutiny pursuant to 
a state RFRA, the courts will continue to encounter cases that 
confront the intersection between free exercise and equal protection. 
Many of those future claims will be strengthened by the power of the 
RFRA’s strict scrutiny mandate behind them. In our article, The Case 
for LGBT Equality: Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and 
Repurposing the Dormant Commerce Clause, we propose an 
alternative analytical framework that links private discrimination in 
public accommodations to the Commerce Clause.58  
 When Jack Phillips and other business owners successfully 
invoke religious freedom laws as a justification for refusing to serve 
LGBT customers, the government is essentially acquiescing to 
discrimination. As the Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged, 
public accommodation laws “prevent[] the economic and social 
balkanization prevalent when businesses decide to serve only their 
own ‘kind,”’ and ensures the uninhibited flow of intra- and interstate 
commerce.59  
One of the reasons the Framers discarded the Articles of 
Confederation and designed a whole new constitutional framework 
was to empower a strong federal government to regulate interstate 
commerce.60 The adverse economic effects caused by private 
discrimination in public accommodations are measurable.61 
Moreover, state approval of this type of discrimination has 
substantial, negative effects on interstate commerce and encroaches 
on federal powers to regulate interstate commerce. Indeed, states 
that acquiesce to discrimination by enabling religious objections like 
Jack Phillips’ will suffer economic losses as people and businesses flee 
                                                                                                     
analysis and arguing that it should be abandoned for purposes of equal protection 
doctrine and its impact on the LGBT community).  
58.  See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality: 
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015 (2016). 
59.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 2105). 
60.  See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–326 (1979) (stating that “[t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an 
immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention”). 
61.  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 293 (citing MICH. DEP’T OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION UNDER MICHIGAN LAW WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74–90 (Jan. 28, 2013),  http://perma.cc/Q6UL-
L3JR (detailing the negative economic effects of anti-gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender discrimination in places of public accommodation)).  
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to more LGBT-friendly environments,62 resulting in economic 
barriers or creating commercial balkanization.63 Ultimately, state-
sanctioned private discrimination in public accommodations will 
affect interstate commerce, which raises potential Dormant 
Commerce Clause concerns.  
Admittedly, the doctrinal fit may not be as seamless as the 
traditional doctrinal analysis, and federal courts may be reluctant 
to apply the Dormant Commerce Clause to constitutional 
challenges like the one at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop. But this 
proposed framework removes the issue from the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the battle between religion and equality. Instead, 
it reframes the issue, focusing on state laws that are used to excuse 
compliance with anti-discrimination mandates and exclude LGBT 
individuals from equality in commercial life. A robust national 
economy supported by the free flow of people and goods in 
interstate commerce is a strong rationale for judicial application of 
                                                                                                     
62.  Big businesses such as Walmart, Target, and Apple have recently threatened 
to boycott states adopting robust religious freedom laws that would shield 
businesses from public accommodation laws if they withheld goods or services 
from same-sex couples. See generally Tim Evans, Angie’s List Canceling Eastside 
Expansion over RFRA, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:38 AM), 
http://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/03/28/angies-list-canceling-eastside-
expansion-rfra/70590738/ (last visited July 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Jeremy Stoppelman, An Open Letter to States Considering 
Imposing Discrimination Laws, YELP (Mar. 26, 2015, 5:52 PM), 
http://officialblog.yelp.com/2015/03/an-open-letter-to-states-considering-imposing-
discrimination-laws.html (last visited July 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review) Claire Zillman, Salesforce Boycotts Indiana over Fear of LGBT 
Discrimination, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:51 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/26/
salesforce-indiana-same-sex-law/ (last visited July 19, 2107) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Other mega-corporations like American Airlines, 
Facebook, Nike, General Mills, Google, The Dow Chemical Company, and Levi 
Strauss have expressed their support for the proposed Equality Act of 2015, which 
would prohibit discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Tom Huddleston, Jr., Google Joins Chorus of Companies Backing LGBT Bill, 
FORTUNE (July 28, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/28/google-equality-
act-lgbt/ (last visited July 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
63.  See C&A Carbone, Inc .v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 390 
(1994) (stating that the Commerce Clause is intended to prevent “economic 
protectionism: and insure the free movement of goods between state borders, 
prohibiting “laws that would excite . . . jealousies and retaliatory measures” 
among the states). 
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the Dormant Commerce Clause to these types of claims.64 
Ultimately, sensible-minded Americans might be more amenable to 
recognizing that the free flow of people and commercial activity in 
interstate commerce is more supportive of our national interests than 
a cultural war about traditional family values.65 
IV. Conclusion 
  Masterpiece Cakeshop is the first of what will likely be a 
litany of cases that force the Court to confront the thorny 
intersection between religious exercise and public accommodation 
laws. While the precise question before the Court in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop involves a multi-layered analysis of First Amendment 
doctrine, the larger context reveals an ongoing battle between the 
assertion of business owners’ free exercise rights and the rights of 
LGBT patrons to indiscriminate service in places of public 
accommodation, strengthened by the existence of state and local 
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  
  Future cases that pose this conflict will likely require the 
Court to reconcile this clash of liberty interests while struggling 
with the application of a RFRA’s strict scrutiny mandate to free 
exercise challenges. The resolution of these competing interests 
will be undoubtedly arduous. But where these two interests seem 
at odds and perhaps irreconcilable, the Court should examine a 
shared value.  
  In their embryonic stage, American public accommodation 
laws were born out of the “holding out” theory. That theory 
suggests that where a business owner holds herself out to the 
public as open for business, she should serve the public 
indiscriminately. The evidence supporting the link between 
discrimination in places of public accommodation and negative 
                                                                                                     
64.  See id. (same). 
65.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the 
motivation behind Colorado’s amendment 2 as a “Kulturkampf”). 
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economic effects is substantial.66  
  Against this backdrop, the Court has been resolute in 
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress 
power to regulate private conduct. In circumventing this 
limitation, Congress and the states have enacted laws regulating 
private conduct in public accommodations under their Commerce 
and state police powers, respectively. Here, Phillips mistakenly 
argues that Colorado’s application of CADA to him, forcing him to 
bake a cake for a same-sex couple in violation of his free exercise 
rights, is the “state action” required for invocation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Any holding that legitimizes this 
argument would amount to government-sanctioned private 
discrimination. Certainly, if the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be 
used to prohibit private discrimination, it should not now be used 
to permit it.   
  Ultimately, the reconciliation of what at first glance 
appears to be irreconcilable liberty interests can be achieved by 
unearthing their mutual purpose. Common to both the regulation 
of private discrimination through public accommodation laws and 
the governmental restriction of free exercise in favor of equality in 
commerce is an important, if not vital, public purpose: 
maintenance of the social order.67 Since judicial approval of 
Phillips’ refusal to serve a same-sex couple would essentially make 
the government complicit in a form of private discrimination, and 
a government sanction of private discrimination is against the 
social order, the Court must affirm the Colorado Court of Appeals’ 
decision. This holding would set the precedent for more robust 
religious freedom cases that are armed with a RFRA and reaffirm 
the longstanding principle that free exercise must bow to equal 
protection when necessary to maintain the social order.  
                                                                                                     
66.  See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 
2105) (citing MICH. DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION UNDER 
MICHIGAN LAW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74–90 (Jan. 28, 
2013),  http://perma.cc/Q6UL-L3JR (detailing the negative economic effects of 
anti-gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender discrimination in places of public 
accommodation)). 
67.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878) (explaining that a 
criminal polygamy law, which restricted a religious practice, was necessary to 
maintain the social order). 
